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The growth of share repurchasing as an element of financial strategy 
for large, publicly held corporations' raises an issue of interpretation 
under the federal income tax that has significance both for ordinary 
investors and for the revenues. That issue-whether a corporate dis- 
tribution which results in the retirement of outstanding shares should 
be treated as essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend-is an en- 
tirely familiar one to tax lawyers, but it is one that has typically been 
confined to closely held or family-owned corporations, whose cash dis- 
tributions are likely to take whatever form best suits the individual 
tax and financial interests of their controlling shareholders. By con- 
trast, the owner of stock in a public company is powerless to dictate 
the form in which corporate distributions may be cast, and the ab- 
sence of a family or other personal relationship between management 
and shareholders is generally expected to relieve management of any 
special concern for the tax objectives of shareholders. Moreover, those 
objectives are probably so diverse and conflicting that no single dis- 
tribution policy would seem capable of satisfying all shareholders in 
equal measure. Consequently, public companies with scattered stock- 
holdings do not commonly generate dividend equivalence problems, 
and the ordinary investor is rarely an object of the tax collector's 
suspicion. 
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1. See Guthart, More Companies Are Buying Back Their Stock, 43 HARV. Bus. REV. 
40 (Mar.-Apr. 1965). The author, in a study of the repurchasing activities of corporations 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, reports that in 1963, the latest year examined, 
almost 15 per cent of the total trading in the shares of General Motors, General Electric, 
and Standard Oil of New Jersey was attributable to the repurchase of shares by the 
companies themselves, while in the same year more than 100 listed companies repur- 
chased enough of their own stock to account for 5 per cent or more of total trading in 
their securities. Id. 40. Corporate funds paid out for reacquired shares increased from 
$273.9 million in 1954 to $1,302.9 million in 1963 and in the latter years actually exceeded 
the total of capital raised by new stock issues. Id. 44. In a later study the same author 
reports that in 1965 New York Stock Exchange corporations repurchased more than 
37,000,000 of their own shares at a cost of almost $2 billion. Guthart, Why Companies 
Are Buying Back Their Own Stock, 23 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 105, 106 (1967). 
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For these reasons, perhaps, share repurchasing has attracted little 
attention from the Treasury and the bar, although the apparent tax 
advantages of repurchasing have been widely stressed by financial 
commentators in recent years.2 Thus, suppose that X Corporation, with 
one million shares of common stock outstanding, is a stable, non-growth 
company which annually generates $1 million of earnings after tax, 
or $1 per share. Unable to reinvest its earnings at a profitable rate of 
return, X decides to distribute the $1 million to its shareholders. The 
stock of X, which normally sells at 10 times earnings, is currently 
quoted at $11, i.e., normal value of $10 plus $1 per share available for 
distribution. 
If X distributes the $1 million as a dividend, and if the shareholders 
of X pay tax at an average rate of 30 per cent, then the net wealth per 
share of an average shareholder following the distribution will be 
$10.70, i.e., normal value of X stock ($10) plus the after-tax value of 
the dividend ($0.70). In the alternative, if X uses the $1 million to 
repurchase its own shares at $11 per share, it will be able to retire ap- 
proximately 90,909 shares at that price. Earnings per share will then 
rise to about $1.10 on the 909,091 shares that remain outstanding, and, 
with no change in the multiplier of 10, the value of the stock held by 
non-selling shareholders will be $11, as compared with an average net 
wealth per share of $10.70 if a dividend is paid. Shareholders who have 
chosen to resell their stock will hold $11 cash for each share sold less 
any capital gain tax resulting from the sale, with the net proceeds 
varying from individual to individual depending on original cost. 
Without detriment to those who prefer to sell, therefore, but pro- 
vided always that the only tax imposed is a capital gain tax on sellers 
disposing of appreciated shares, X Corporation can benefit non-selling 
shareholders by applying its "unwanted" cash assets to the retirement 
of outstanding stock instead of paying dividends. Aside from tax ef- 
fects, though possibly bearing some relation thereto, share repurchase 
has the further advantage of providing an option to shareholders, since 
those who desire current income can obtain it by selling a portion of 
their shares, while those who do not can avoid it by retaining all of 
theirs. 
The critical assumptions that underlie the tax results just described 
are, first, that repurchase produces capital gain (or loss) for share- 
2. See, e.g., Bierman & West, The Acquisition of Common Stock by the Corporate 
Issuer, 21 J. OF FINANCE 687 (1966); Brigham, The Profitability of a Firm's Purchase of 
Its Own Common Stock, 7 CALIF. MANAGEMENT REv. 69 (Winter 1964); Farrar & Selwyn, 
Taxes, Corporate Financial Policy and the Return to Investors, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 444 (1967). 
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holders who choose to surrender their shares to the company, and 
second, that repurchase has no present tax consequences (other than 
the postponement of gain or loss) for those who do not. The Internal 
Revenue Service has thus far raised no question about the legitimacy 
of these results as a matter of law. They are also either ignored or taken 
for granted by the tax bar, presumably for the reason, mentioned above, 
that dividend equivalence problems are rarely associated with publicly 
held corporations. The income tax treatment of share repurchases is im- 
portant in dollar terms, however, and the purpose of this paper is to 
consider whether the assumptions described as critical are truly as 
well-founded as appears to be supposed. 
I. Financial Consequences of Share Repurchasing 
Before the issue of proper tax treatment of repurchases is discussed, 
it may be useful to draw some conclusions about share repurchasing as a 
financial device, especially as it compares and contrasts with conven- 
tional dividend payments. The specific question is whether, apart from 
taxes, share repurchasing accomplishes one or more financial goals 
which are not achieved by ordinary dividend distributions, either at 
all or in the same degree. As indicated below, analysis suggests that 
share repurchasing and ordinary dividend payments are largely inter- 
changeable from an economic standpoint, although considerations of 
management self-interest may occasionally lead to a preference for the 
former. 
Financial writers generally seem to agree that "the most important 
motivation behind stock repurchase [is] the desire to reduce the equity 
capital of the company."3 Many corporations have experienced an ex- 
ceptional growth in liquid assets during the past dozen years because 
of highly profitable operations, accelerated depreciation practices, and 
the levelling off of new investment requirements within the industry 
itself. Lacking internal investment opportunities which promise an 
adequate rate of return, and having cash balances on hand greater 
than needed to finance normal expansion requirements, these com- 
panies have concluded in many instances that excess working capital 
can best be employed to shrink the equity base through the repurchase 
of common shares. Apart from any comparison with dividends, self- 
ownership is said to be preferable to purchasing shares in other cor- 
3. Guthart, Why Companies Are Buying Back Their Own Stock, 23 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS 
J. 105, 106 (1967); see Brigham, supra note 2. 
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porations because of management's intimate knowledge of its own 
company's earnings prospects. In addition, the company's earnings per 
share are directly increased by reducing the number of shares out- 
standing. By contrast, if funds are invested in the stock of other cor- 
porations, the investing company's earnings are increased by no more 
than the dividends received. 
In a similar vein, some commentators have suggested that share re- 
purchasing may be useful in helping to maintain or achieve a desired 
relationship between debt and equity in the firm's capital structure.4 
It is conventionally assumed that a corporation can reduce its overall 
cost of capital by replacing equity with cheaper borrowed funds up 
to some safe and supportable degree of leverage. Thus a company 
which regards itself as under-leveraged can improve its capital struc- 
ture by issuing debt securities and applying the proceeds to the retire- 
ment of common shares. Similarly, a firm which considers that it 
already has achieved a cost-minimizing debt-equity ratio, but which 
finds that ratio threatened by the rapid accumulation of retained 
earnings, may repurchase outstanding shares as a means of preserving 
the existing proportion. In either event share repurchase has been 
recommended as a preferred procedure for contracting the corpora- 
tion's equity base where a higher ratio of debt to equity is deemed 
consistent with the desired level of financial risk. 
Equity contraction can be accepted without challenge as a valid 
financial objective. When income tax distinctions are ignored, how- 
ever, it is apparent that this goal is as well served by paying cash divi- 
dends in the conventional manner as by repurchasing outstanding 
shares. The point can be seen most easily if the repurchase program 
is assumed (unrealistically for the moment) to be carried out on a pro 
rata basis. Since equity-contraction can be achieved only by a cash 
payment to shareholders, and since cash can be paid out as effectively 
by dividend as by repurchase, the advantage of the repurchase proce- 
dure, if any, must reside in its comparative effect on aggregate share 
values. Since pro rata repurchasing will not alter proportionate stock- 
holdings, a favorable effect on aggregate share values would normally 
occur only if the value of the corporation, viewed as an entity, would 
be enhanced by a reduction or limitation in the number of its owner- 
ship units. That, however, is unlikely to be the result. The value of 
4. Ellis, Repurchase Stock to Revitalize Equity, 43 HARV. Bus. REv. 119 (July-Aug. 
1965). See Porterfield, Dividend Policy and Shareholders' Wealth, in FINANCIAL RESEARCH 
AND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 54 (A. Robichek ed. 1967); J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 210 (1968). 
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the firm, conventionally, is a function of two factors: the anticipated 
earnings available for distribution and the rate at which those earn- 
ings are capitalized by the market. It is clear that neither factor is 
affected by the number of common shares outstanding, and it should 
be equally clear that neither is in any way determined by the form in 
which distributions are made to shareholders. As a theoretical matter, 
therefore, and apart from taxes, it is relatively easy to conclude that 
nothing is accomplished through a pro rata repurchase that could not 
as well be accomplished through an ordinary dividend unaccompanied 
by the surrender of shares. 
If the pro rata assumption is discarded, the question just considered 
becomes slightly (though only slightly) more complex. Stock repur- 
chasing, whether by ordinary market transactions or by public invita- 
tion to tender, is inevitably non-pro rata in the case of a publicly held 
corporation. Thus, at least that factor-non-pro rata distribution-is 
present and serves to distinguish repurchases from pro rata dividends. 
Its significance, however, hardly lies in the field of valuation, since 
the size and composition of the shareholder group before and after 
the repurchase obviously have no bearing on anticipated earnings and 
the capitalization rate. To put it otherwise, neither of the conventional 
elements of valuation responds to the number or identity either of 
the corporation's continuing shareholders or of those who prefer to 
sell out for cash. The sole significance of the non-pro rata factor, there- 
fore, is that stock ownership is concentrated in the hands of share- 
holders who do not choose to sell or tender their shares, just as it would 
be if the same individuals received cash dividends which they then 
used to purchase additional shares of their corporation in the market. 
Thus, by repurchasing outstanding shares the corporation shortcuts 
the investment decision which non-selling shareholders might have 
made for themselves if the same funds had been distributed to them 
as pro rata dividends. This investment decision is, of course, negatively 
reflected in the shareholder's election to retain his shares while others 
are surrendering theirs; but apart from differences in the level of con- 
sciousness at which such individual choices are made the essential 
equivalence to a dividend-cum-purchase is apparent. 
On the whole these comments apply with equal force whether the 
company's purpose is to distribute excess working capital or to change 
or restore debt-equity relationships. Either goal can justify a cash dis- 
tribution. To that end, however, share repurchase and dividends are 
perfect substitutes for each other because both procedures result in 
cash payments of equal amount. Again, the difference between them, 
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aside from taxes, is merely that repurchase itself produces a de facto 
adjustment of individual investment portfolios, while dividend pay- 
ments leave such adjustments to be carried out by shareholders buying 
and selling stock in the market. 
In many instances, share repurchasing is said to be prompted by the 
corporation's obligation to issue shares under employee stock option 
plans (or in connection with acquisitions).5 The avowed purpose is to 
avoid dilution of existing shareholders' equity by maintaining the 
number of shares outstanding at present levels. It is clear, at the 
same time, that repurchasing shares for reissue to optionees does 
not protect the value of the shareholder's equity against dilution, 
since optionees gain at the shareholders' expense whether they receive 
newly issued or treasury stock or accept cash for the cancellation of 
their rights. Concededly, the decision to repurchase shares has the 
effect of restoring (that is, of increasing) the proportionate equity 
interests of those shareholders who do not choose to sell. But that 
is a goal that can be attained only by distributing cash otherwise 
available for dividends, and as usual it is one which the shareholders 
could accomplish for themselves by reinvesting such dividends in the 
company's shares. Beyond this, it is also true that the corporation may 
decide to make a cash distribution in response to the exercise of stock 
options simply because it is unable to put the additional capital to a 
profitable internal use. Again, however, for that purpose dividends and 
repurchase are interchangeable. 
Finally, mention should be made of the notion, frequently found in 
the financial literature, that share repurchase can sometimes be recom- 
mended as a suitable investment for the company's residual funds. 
The meaning of "investment" in this context is not always clear, but 
most writers appear to have nothing more in mind than that a dis- 
tribution of excess working capital is the obvious and appropriate 
course to follow when attractive internal investment opportunities are 
lacking. Used this way the term "investment" seems to refer only to 
the de facto adjustment of individual portfolios described above, i.e., 
to the contraction of the company's equity base and to the accompany- 
ing increase in earnings per share on the reduced number of shares 
outstanding. It is difficult to perceive any other meaning. Certainly 
repurchasing possesses none of the customary attributes of internal 
asset acquisition, such as the purchase of plant and equipment. In the 
latter case the size of the enterprise is maintained or possibly increased 
5. Guthart, supra note 3, at 107. 
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and there is no decline in shareholders' equity. In the former, cash 
assets are reduced precisely because a profitable opportunity for in- 
ternal asset acquisition is lacking, and the corporation's equity is di- 
minished correspondingly. Although stock repurchasing increases the 
earnings per share, there is no real increase in the earnings available 
for distribution. The contrast with investment in conventional operat- 
ing assets is evident. 
Having stressed that share repurchasing merely increases the per- 
centage interests held by continuing shareholders, one may conjecture 
that the management of a public corporation would rarely act so as 
to alter the proportionate interests of the company's shareholders if 
it were not for the tax advantages. Although shareholders desire and 
expect that management will exercise its own judgment in determin- 
ing whether corporate funds should be committed internally, used to 
retire debt, or paid out as dividends, adjusting levels of participation 
among the individual shareholders would seem to lie outside the cus- 
tomary scope of the directors' responsibility. That decision, essentially 
in the realm of portfolio management, is presumably better left to the 
judgment of the shareholders themselves than accomplished on their 
behalf through corporate action. Even if management regards the cur- 
rent market price of the company's stock as low in relation to the in- 
trinsic investment value of the security, there seems to be no justifiable 
reason why corporate assets should be used directly to benefit some 
shareholders at the expense of others. Indeed, one would think that 
management would and perhaps ought to be indifferent as to whether 
an anticipated rise in market price is shared in by a larger or a smaller 
group of shareholders. 
All this is not to suggest that management's own self-interest is never 
involved in the choice of distribution procedure. Thus, an increase in 
ordinary dividend payments, even in the form of a year-end extra, 
might make it necessary for the corporation to offer the shareholders 
some explanation if the increased payment was not coincident with 
a substantial rise in reported net earnings. Assuming that the dividend 
increase merely reflects the absence of attractive investment oppor- 
tunities, the explanation, if perfectly forthright, would tend to cast 
doubt on management's ability because it would suggest that the com- 
pany had reached a condition of partial liquidation.6 On the other 
hand, to the extent that share repurchasing is carried out through 
ordinary brokerage transactions in the market, the entire matter is 
6. Remark of David Jones in discussion following Porterfield, supra note 4, at 69-70. 
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less public and the shareholders may neither expect nor seek a detailed 
explanation of the transaction. Moreover, since company executives 
who hold unexercised stock options do not share in ordinary pro rata 
dividend payments, a dividend declaration which is desirable from 
the viewpoint of shareholders may be much less so from the viewpoint 
of optionees.7 By contrast, share repurchase confers the same quanti- 
tative benefit on option holders in the form of increased option values 
as it does on non-selling shareholders in the form of increased share 
values. Hence, from the optionees' viewpoint, share repurchase may 
be superior to ordinary dividends as a means of distributing excess 
working capital. Finally, but presumably least prevalent or important, 
shares may be repurchased from a dissident shareholder to secure the 
control status of an inside group, an objective for which ordinary 
dividends are largely useless. 
Apart from these considerations of management preference, the 
general conclusion that has been reached, here and elsewhere,8 is that 
share repurchase and dividends are perfect substitutes for each other 
as long as income tax distinctions are disregarded. Once personal taxes 
are taken into account, however, an important difference appears, and 
the relative advantage of repurchasing becomes evident. Under a tax 
structure which favors capital gains over ordinary income the stock of 
a corporation which elects to package cash distributions as capital gain 
obviously is worth more to shareholders than that of an identical firm 
which presents investors with taxable dividends. Accordingly, the de- 
cision to repurchase stock can be justified as a strategy for maximizing 
the value of the company's shares by increasing the after-tax value of 
its cash distributions. Indeed, assuming that the economic effects of 
repurchase are equal to or no worse than those arising from the pay- 
ment of ordinary dividends, the logical though somewhat startling 
conclusion is that repurchase should substitute entirely for dividends, 
with the quantity of shares available for resale being restored from 
time to time through stock dividends or splits. This is precisely the 
model generally assumed by financial theorists in integrating personal 
taxes into a normative theory of share valuation.9 Since the personal 
income attainable by shareholders from a given stream of corporate 
earnings is increased if cash distributions are made in the form of low- 
7. See W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 87 (1965). 
8. See works cited note 2 supra. But see Elton & Gruber, The Effect of Share Repur- 
chase on the Value of the Firm, 23 J. OF FINANCE 135 (1968), suggesting that differences in 
transaction costs may in some cases tend to favor ordinary dividends. 
9. Farrar & Selwyn, supra note 2; see Myers, Taxes, Corporate Financial Policy and 
the Return to Investors: Comment, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 455 (1967). 
746 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.215 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 16:12:01 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends 
taxed capital gain rather than as ordinary income, an optimal distribu- 
tion policy is described as one in which stock is always repurchased in 
lieu of paying cash dividends. To be sure, as a practical matter, corpo- 
rate directors do not and cannot go so far. Nevertheless, the substantial 
and continuing growth in repurchasing by major firms suggests that its 
benefits are now very widely understood. 
II. Optional Stock Redemptions and Optional Dividends 
The assumption that repurchase results in capital gain (or loss) to 
the selling shareholders derives from Section 302 of the Internal Reve- 
nue Code. That section provides that a distribution in redemption of 
common stock shall be treated as an "exchange" if the redemption 
(a) is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend," (b) reduces the share- 
holder's percentage ownership of the corporation's voting stock to less 
than 80 per cent of such ownership before the redemption, or (c) com- 
pletely terminates the shareholder's interest in the corporation. A re- 
demption that meets any one of these tests produces capital gain or 
loss to the shareholder whose stock is redeemed; a redemption that 
meets none of them is treated as a dividend taxable as ordinary income. 
The percentage ownership and complete termination tests, which 
appear in Sections 302(b)(2) and 302(b)(3), specifically focus on the 
non-pro rata character of the redemption and contain detailed rules 
which, if carefully complied with, assure that a redemption distribu- 
tion will not be treated as a dividend to its recipient. The "not essen- 
tially equivalent" test of Section 302(b)(1), though not limited in terms 
to non-pro rata redemptions, is generally thought to subsume the same 
criterion and to provide capital gain or loss for non-pro rata distribu- 
tions which do not meet the specific requirements of Sections 302(b)(2) 
or 302(b)(3) but which for other reasons seem not to involve the avoid- 
ance of ordinary dividend income. Isolated redemptions of part of the 
company's preferred stock, or redemptions of common which are pro 
rata only because stock belonging to one independent or hostile family 
member is attributed to another, are among the illustrations commonly 
given of the operation of Section 302(b)(1).10 
Of course, the factor of non-pro rata distribution is present virtually 
by definition in the case of repurchases by a publicly held corpora- 
tion. In many and perhaps most instances the selling shareholder 
10. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPrORATIONS AND SHARE- 
HOLDERS 292 (1966). 
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disposes of all or the greater number of his shares, thereby meeting 
the reduction in percentage of ownership or complete termination of 
interest test. Even if he does not-as where there is an "over-tender" 
and the corporation accepts shares pro rata from those tendering-the 
fact that the selling shareholder occupies a minority status and there- 
fore lacks control over the company's dividend policy is generally 
thought sufficient to bring the redemption within the "not essentially 
equivalent" category of Section 302(b)(1). 
The tax treatment of continuing shareholders is not specifically set 
forth in the Code. It is well established by court decisions'1 and ad- 
ministrative rulings,'l however, that a non-redeeming shareholder 
realizes no gain or loss or dividend income solely because all or a por- 
tion of the stock of other shareholders was redeemed, even though the 
effect of the redemption is to increase his percentage ownership of the 
corporation. This result can be supported by inference from Section 302 
itself: since Congress went to considerable trouble in that section to 
delineate precise rules for assuring that qualifying redemptions would 
not be impeded by the threat of dividend income to the shareholder 
whose stock is redeemed, it should not be presumed that an equally 
serious impediment was intended to survive in the form of a dividend 
threat to non-redeeming shareholders in such instances. The inference, 
in brief, is that Congress intended Section 302 to preempt the redemp- 
tion field for tax purposes. Alternatively, the same conclusion can be 
reached under the general Code requirement of realization, since the 
non-redeeming shareholder receives nothing directly from the corpo- 
rate treasury that can be characterized as a dividend distribution. To 
be sure, his percentage interest in the corporation increases as a result 
of the redemption; but since the increase is offset by a reduction in 
size of the entity itself, the dollar value of the stock owned by the non- 
redeeming shareholder is unaffected by the distribution. Hence, even 
the element of indirect enrichment is lacking. 
To summarize, the technical argument for favorable tax treatment 
of selling shareholders rests on Section 302, and of non-selling share- 
holders on the same provision, inferentially, with support from the 
general Code requirement of realization. These rules contemplate a 
pattern in which one shareholder or group of shareholders withdraws 
from the firm, wholly or partly, with a consequent increase in the per- 
centage ownership of the remaining shareholders. Under long-standing 
11. E.g., Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir, 1958). 
12. E.g., Rev. Rul. 59-286, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 103; Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 
920. 
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decisions which are elaborately articulated in the Code and in cases 
and rulings, the withdrawing shareholder is treated as having sold or 
exchanged a capital asset, while the continuing shareholders are con- 
sidered to have realized nothing from the corporation that can be 
viewed as a taxable gain. Although the withdrawal or shift in interest 
is financed out of the corporate treasury rather than out of individual 
bank accounts, the transaction is regarded as "similar to a common 
stock shareholder's sale of [all or] a part of his common stock to an- 
other person."13 
These results must be considered among the basic structural ele- 
ments of Subchapter C and are no longer open to any fundamental 
challenge. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that they reflect a 
conscious and deliberate policy choice and do not flow inevitably from 
the transaction itself. Suppose A and B, equal shareholders, agree after 
negotiation that B shall withdraw from the firm by selling his stock 
to the corporation at a stated price for cash. The decision to treat the 
redemption of B's stock as a capital transaction cannot be explained 
in a wholly satisfactory way simply by regarding the redemption as an 
analogue to a sale of those shares to another individual, although that 
is the justification most commonly offered. It is true that the redemp- 
tion reduces B's interest to zero and increases A's interest to 100 per 
cent. But the fact that these changes are accompanied by a distribution 
of corporate assets impairs the sale analogy for at least two reasons. 
First, the redemption of B's stock permanently reduces the corpora- 
tion's earnings and profits account whereas a sale has no effect on 
earnings and profits. Amounts which might later be taxed as ordinary 
dividends to the buyer of shares are thus converted into capital gain 
by the redemption. Second, and more important in the present context, 
the redemption distribution is non-pro rata-and thus resembles a 
conventional sale-only because A agrees to waive his right to a pro- 
portionate share of it and to redirect that share to B. The transaction 
can, therefore, be seen as a two-step procedure involving, first, a pro 
rata dividend to A and B which reduces by half the value of the com- 
pany's stock, and second, an election by A to apply to the purchase 
price of B's interest his one-half share of the total received, after which 
the stock formerly owned by B is cancelled. So viewed, the redemption 
device is merely a shortcut by which the two steps collapse into one. 
These observations tend to confirm that Section 302 was designed 
13. Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income 
Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32 
(1952). 
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with a specific policy goal in mind and not simply to carry out general 
principles relating to the tax treatment of stock sales. Most would 
agree that the aim of the section is to facilitate occasional, and often 
major, shifts in ownership interests among the shareholders of closely- 
held or family-owned corporations for whose shares no active market 
exists apart from the company itself. That, of course, is the image of 
Section 302 which tax lawyers generally have in mind; virtually every 
technical detail in the section confirms that Congress did as well. Thus, 
family attribution rules and other provisions for constructive owner- 
ship of stock, restrictions relating to the redemption of stock from con- 
trolling shareholders, the disproportionality standard itself together 
with the prohibition against planned series of redemptions which are 
pro rata in the aggregate-these rules obviously contemplate a tightly 
knit shareholder group whose individual interests are virtually iden- 
tical to those of the corporation. Hence if taxing redemptions in ac- 
cordance with the two-step characterization mentioned above is rejected 
in this context, as of course it must be, the reason is not that it fails 
to describe the transaction accurately but that it runs counter to the 
basic legislative aim, which is to bear lightly on withdrawals from in- 
corporated partnerships. 
Transactions of the latter sort, though perhaps formally initiated 
by the corporation, are necessarily the product of negotiation and 
agreement among the shareholders. That is their distinguishing mark. 
Redemption price, terms of payment, total number of shares to be re- 
deemed, even the tax consequences, must be bargained out and agreed 
to before the redemption is authorized. The reason, of course, is that 
the redemption is intended to alter the stock interests of particular 
individuals in specified ways-for example, through the surrender of 
control by one partner to another, through the retirement of older 
family members, or on the occasion of the death or resignation of an 
executive owning shares in the firm. The chief technical features of 
Section 302 confirm that the section contemplates an advance under- 
standing or agreement by the shareholders. Thus, a shareholder de- 
siring to redeem a portion of his shares can count on meeting the 80 
per cent ownership test of Section 302(b)(2) only if he knows precisely 
how many shares, if any, are to be redeemed by others at the same time. 
Similarly, a complete termination of interest under Section 302(b)(3) 
depends upon the company's ability to acquire all of the redeeming 
shareholder's stock, which may in turn depend upon the willingness 
of other shareholders to retain all or most of theirs. These provisions 
were developed to permit and encourage taxpayers to act in relatively 
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certain reliance on their applicability in a given case, and it is clear that 
they contemplate effective planning based on more or less formal 
agreement among the shareholders as to who will and who will not 
present his shares for redemption. Admittedly, Section 302(b)(1) is 
not limited on its face to planned redemptions-indeed, it is not 
limited on its face in any way at all. The immediate legislative history 
of the provision, however, indicates that it was intended chiefly to 
exempt redemptions of non-voting preferred stock which occur with- 
out voluntary action by the shareholder.14 The Service, apart from its 
silence on the question of share repurchasing, has generally been un- 
willing to concede that the provision has more than a minor role to 
play. 
By contrast, publicly held corporations which adopt widescale share 
repurchasing programs are motivated by a very different set of con- 
siderations and have different goals than are typical of Section 302 
transactions. In most instances, the motives are those generally asso- 
ciated with partial liquidation-that is, to avoid the accumulation of 
liquid assets in excess of normal expansion requirements. To meet 
this objective the company sets aside for distribution an amount that 
represents the excess of current earnings over the sum of normal divi- 
dends plus needed additions to plant and working capital, or some 
fraction thereof. The company is indifferent to how many shares that 
amount will repurchase, although it might in prudence set an upper 
limit on the price it will pay. It is equally indifferent to the number 
or the identity of the shareholders who choose to sell. Indeed, all of 
the company's shareholders would be welcome to participate in the 
distribution by disposing of a portion of their shares, and there is even 
the theoretical, if not the practical, possibility that the distribution 
will turn out to be pro rata. 
These factors, together with the point that such distributions are 
likely to occur annually or at more or less regular intervals, suggest 
that there is a fundamental dissimilarity between the repurchase of 
shares by public companies and the occasional redemption transac- 
tions thought typical of Section 302. It is true, as a practical matter, 
that redemptions are likely to be carried out on a non-pro rata basis 
in both situations. In the public case, however, the non-pro rata factor 
results from the differing investment decisions of the individual share- 
holders acting independently of one another, and in that sense is acci- 
dental. The funds appropriated for distribution are available to all of 
14. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-5 (1954); see Treas. Reg. ? 1.302-2(a) (1955). 
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the shareholders equally until the distribution is completed; each 
shareholder has an option to accept or reject his proportionate share 
by surrendering or withholding his stock. The choice he makes de- 
pends on the medium of payment-cash or an increased stock interest 
-that he prefers. Moreover, the distribution generally will occur re- 
gardless of which or how many shareholders elect to participate in it. 
By contrast, in the typical Section 302 case, the non-pro rata factor 
reflects a bargained-out agreement between selling and non-selling 
shareholders and is accomplished by design; the distribution is made 
only after the recipient's identity has been settled through prearrange- 
ment. 
These dissimilarities suggest that the pattern of taxation normally 
associated with Section 302 is not properly applicable to the public 
corporation case. Under circumstances which typically include negotia- 
tion and prior agreement, Section 302 in effect disregards the non- 
redeeming shareholder's waiver of equal participation in the cash dis- 
tribution and treats the redemption as a complete description of the 
event. But in the public case, where shareholders are free to participate 
in the distribution at their own discretion, the appropriate tax pattern, 
recognizing the factor of individual choice, might well conform to the 
two-step characterization described earlier.15 The distribution would 
then be regarded as a pro rata dividend to all of the company's share- 
holders, sellers and non-sellers alike, followed by such stock sales as 
actually do occur. All shareholders would receive a dividend taxable as 
ordinary income and would add this amount to the basis of their shares. 
Selling shareholders would then recognize capital gain (or loss) mea- 
sured by the difference between the amount realized on the sale and 
the basis of the shares sold, such basis being increased to reflect the 
amount taxed as a dividend. 
To illustrate, assume that A and B each own 100 shares of a publicly 
held corporation which has 1,000,000 shares outstanding and which 
decides to repurchase 50,000 shares of its own stock at a total cost of 
$1,000,000. Assume that A, whose basis for his 100 shares is $2,500, 
elects to retain all of his shares, while B. whose basis is $1,500, elects 
to sell all of his. Under the view taken here, both A and B receive a 
taxable dividend of $100 ($1 per share). A's basis is increased to $2,600, 
B's to $1,600. If the sale price of B's shares is $2,000, B has a capital 
gain of $400 ($2,000, amount realized, less basis of $1,600) in addition 
to the dividend of $100. Similarly, if A later sells his shares for $2,000, 
15. See Cohen et al., supra note 13, at 16. 
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he then has a capital loss of $600 ($2,600, basis, less $2,000, amount 
realized) in addition to the $100 dividend previously included. In B's 
case (as in A's) nothing turns on whether the stock sale can actually be 
traced to the corporation as purchaser, nor on whether repurchases 
are made in the market or through public invitation to tender. It is 
sufficient that A and B were both stockholders of record on the date 
the distribution took place. The consequence is that each receives a 
taxable dividend which increases the basis of his shares for the purpose 
of computing gain or loss on subsequent sale, and it is not important 
whether such sale occurs at the same time or later. 
The argument, then, is that share repurchases by public com- 
panies should be treated as dividends to both sellers and non-sellers 
for tax purposes, and that the presence of a non-pro rata factor ought 
not to be accepted as a dividend defense in this situation. Some sup- 
port for this position can be found, by way of analogy, in Section 305 
(b)(2), which provides that stock dividends, normally non-taxable on 
receipt, are to be taxed as ordinary income when the shareholder is 
free to elect to receive the dividend in stock or cash. For example, if 
a corporation declares a dividend payable in its own shares, but with 
the provision that any shareholder may elect cash instead, shareholders 
who choose to receive stock are required to include the shares received 
in income at their fair market value. The section treats the shareholder 
as if he had received cash plus subscription rights, or as if he had first 
received cash and then had reinvested the cash in additional shares. 
What is striking about Section 305(b)(2) in the present context is 
that it extends ordinary dividend treatment to a transaction which 
has an economic effect similar or identical to share repurchasing. Thus, 
assume that A and B each own 50 per cent of a corporation's outstand- 
ing stock and that it is agreed to increase A's interest to 60 per cent 
and to reduce B's interest to 40 per cent. The desired result can be 
achieved either (1) by redeeming enough shares from B for cash so 
that his participation is brought down to 40 per cent, or (2) by dis- 
tributing the same amount of cash to B without redeeming any of his 
shares but with A electing to receive a stock dividend, in lieu of cash, 
sufficient to increase his interest to 60 per cent. Apart from taxes, noth- 
ing turns on the procedure actually adopted. From a tax standpoint, 
however, Section 302 and Section 305(b)(2) produce conflicting results. 
Under 302, B receives capital gain and A no income at all; under 
305(b)(2) both receive a dividend. These results diverge, moreover, 
even though the same element of non-pro rata distribution appears in 
each. 
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While the two provisions thus respond differently to equivalent 
transactions, the apparent conflict between them has not proved trou- 
blesome so far. Indeed it appears to have gone unnoticed.'6 The reason, 
presumably, is that apart from the swift growth of share repurchasing 
in recent years, stock redemptions have been employed almost entirely 
to carry out planned withdrawals from participation in closely-held 
corporations, while optional stock dividend arrangements have been 
used largely as a means of satisfying the diverse preferences of public 
investors for current income or capital appreciation. Section 305(b)(2) 
makes it reasonably clear, however, that Congress did not intend op- 
tional dividends-dividends which are elective as to medium of pay- 
ment-to escape from treatment as taxable pro rata distributions; and 
one would expect that this attitude would apply as readily when op- 
tional dividends are cast in the form of stock redemptions as when they 
take the shape of a right to receive additional shares. 
The Treasury has recently demonstrated its concern with the prob- 
lem of elective dividends by adopting a revised set of regulations under 
Section 305(b).17 These regulations are directed at two types of op- 
tional stock dividend plans which are designed to give shareholders a 
choice between cash and additional shares of stock without producing 
a tax on those who choose stock. Under the first plan a corporation 
issues two classes of common stock; dividends are payable in equal 
amounts on both classes but the corporation is free to declare a cash 
dividend on one class and a stock dividend on the other. The second 
involves a special type of stock which is not entitled to cash dividends. 
Instead, it is convertible into an increasing number of ordinary divi- 
dend-paying common shares. It has been assumed by some that these 
16. The President's Tax Reform Proposals, which appeared too late to be reflected 
in this paper, do relate stock dividends to stock redemptions by extending Section 305(b) 
to a planned series of redemptions in which all shareholders are given an option to 
redeem a stated proportion of their shares at periodic intervals. Both the redeeming and 
the non-redeeming shareholders would be considered to have received taxable dividends. 
TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF APRIL 21, 1969, Public 
Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 224-25 (Comm. Print April 22, 1969). The new measure, which is 
very briefly described in the President's message, is apparently quite limited in scope. 
Thus, although the great bulk of shares bought by public companies is purchased through 
brokers in the open market, the new provision seems to extend only to preannounced 
periodic tender offers. In addition, it would seem to be limited to cases in which the 
company offers to redeem from each shareholder a fixed percentage of his shares. 
Apparently excluded is the much more common situation in which the total amount 
of cash to be distributed is predetermined, and the company then takes up shares in 
any proportion until the fund dedicated to repurchasing is exhausted. In the latter 
case, as suggested in the text, the appropriate result is reached if each shareholder is 
treated as if he had received a dividend in the amount of his pro rata share of the total 
cash distribution; additional amounts received by selling shareholders produce capital gain 
or loss. 
17. Treas. Reg. ?? 1.305-2, 1.305-3 (1969). 
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plans would escape taxability under Section 305(b). The revised regu- 
lations, however, through a broad construction of the technical re- 
quirements of that provision, treat the receipt of stock dividends in 
the first case and of additional conversion rights in the second as tax- 
able dividends. 
Though likely to breed controversy, the regulations reach results 
which seem completely consistent with the purpose of Section 305(b)- 
to prevent shareholders from taking advantage of the tax-free status 
of stock dividends in cases in which cash dividends of equal value are 
also available. It may be, however, that in closing off the optional divi- 
dend devices just described, the regulations will further stimulate 
corporate financial managers to resort to share repurchasing as an al- 
ternate technique. Section 305(b) would seem to be of no direct help 
to the Treasury in dealing with the latter procedure, since the lan- 
guage of the section, however broadly read, can hardly be stretched 
to cover redemptions. Thus, uniformity in the tax treatment of elec- 
tive dividends depends on the perception that when shares are re- 
acquired by means of a public tender or through transactions in the 
market, the tax pattern normally associated with Section 302 is in- 
applicable. In turn, this perception depends both on realizing that 
share repurchase is ultimately a substitute for pro rata dividends and 
on being aware that Section 302 is a provision of limited scope and 
purpose. 
III. Conclusion 
The assumptions which underlie the view that share repurchases 
are not equivalent to ordinary taxable dividends seem less than com- 
pletely satisfactory. There is little doubt, in the great majority of cases, 
that share repurchase is part of the firm's dividend decision.'8 In an 
analogous area, Congress has made it clear that optional dividends are 
to be taxed as ordinary pro rata distributions when they take the form 
of stock or cash, and the Treasury has recently taken steps to prevent cir- 
cumvention of that principle. In economic effect, optional redemptions 
of common stock cannot convincingly be distinguished from optional 
common stock dividends. More specifically, Section 302, which normally 
protects stock redemptions from dividend treatment, does not appear to 
have been worked out with wide-scale share repurchasing in mind, and 
it is arguable that the section lacks jurisdiction over transactions of the 
sort described. 
18. See J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 208. 
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The question raised here about stock redemptions is part of a larger 
problem which concerns the relationship of the federal income tax to 
the development of optional dividend policies by publicly held corpo- 
rations seeking to satisfy conflicting preferences among their share- 
holders. On the standard assumption that some investors prefer current 
income while others prefer capital appreciation, the most acceptable 
procedure, apart from tax impediments, "would be to give each stock- 
holder the option of taking dividends either in cash or in stock of 
equivalent value, as he preferred."' Since the tax law treats cash divi- 
dends as ordinary income, a choice of cash or stock can best be achieved 
by retaining all earnings in the corporation and permitting those share- 
holders who desire current income to declare their own dividends, in 
effect, by selling small amounts of stock annually with resulting capital 
gain or loss. Distribution of regular annual stock dividends represent- 
ing the current year's earnings, which can then be sold by those who 
desire current income, would afford shareholders the same oppor- 
tunity.20 But if the corporation finds it desirable to distribute cash assets 
-either because the market would react adversely to the total absence 
of cash dividends or because management regards the company as over- 
capitalized-the tax law customarily treats the amounts received as 
ordinary taxable income. Whatever may be said of its rationality, the 
distinction between earnings distributed and earnings retained is 
absolutely vital under the taxing system as it stands, and change is in- 
conceivable apart from a broad legislative reworking of the law. Self- 
help measures, such as share repurchasing, which distort the customary 
and intended pattern of taxation should therefore be unwelcome to the 
Treasury, and where a technical basis for opposition exists they should 
be opposed. 
19. B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTrLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 502 (1962). 
20. Smith, Tax Treatment of Dividends, in HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMM. TAX RE- 
VISION COMPENDIUM 1543, 1548-9 (Comm. print 1959). 
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